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Abstract 
A crucial contemporary policy question for governments across the globe is how 
to cope with international crime and terrorist networks. Many such “dark” 
networks—that is, networks that operate covertly and illegally—display a remarkable 
level of resilience when faced with shocks and attacks. Based on an in-depth 
study of three cases (MK, the armed wing of the African National Congress 
in South Africa during apartheid; FARC, the Marxist guerrilla movement in 
Colombia; and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE, in Sri Lanka), we present 
a set of propositions to outline how shocks impact dark network characteristics 
(resources and legitimacy) and networked capabilities (replacing actors, linkages, 
balancing integration and differentiation) and how these in turn affect a dark network’s 
resilience over time. We discuss the implications of our findings for policymakers. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Our study aims to contribute to the analysis of social networks and, in particular, 
the development of a new terrain of research called dark networks, which centers on 
covert networks operating illegally, outside the boundaries of the law (Milward & 
Raab, 2006; Raab & Milward, 2003). This aim is inspired by one of the most important 
policy problems of the 21st century, which concerns how governments across 
the globe can collaborate more effectively to best cope with the threats dark networks 
pose. International crime and terrorism are increasingly organized as 
transnational dark networks, which have flourished as the state has ceded territory 
to markets (Arquilla & Ronfeld, 2001). In addition to terrorism, the illegal trades in 
drugs, arms, intellectual property, people, and money have been called “the five 
wars of globalization” (Naím, 2003), which constitute an increasing problem for 
governments and the international community. From a policy standpoint, the most 
important issue for governments is to better understand why some dark networks 
are able to sustain shocks and attacks that would destroy others. In this paper we 
attempt to develop a method and a model for helping to answer the important question: 
Why are some dark networks more resilient than others? 
 
Our work both builds on and differs from two prominent lines of research that 
have emerged since September 11, 2001, both of which study the vulnerabilities 
and dynamics of dark networks from a relational perspective. The first of these, 
which we call the “network-analytic approach,” stems from a rich theoretical tradition 
in social network analysis (including theoretical modeling) that attempts to 
explain the vulnerabilities of dark networks on the basis of relations between actors 
and the ensuing structural characteristics (e.g., see Borgatti, 2006; Bueno de 
Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Carley, 2006; Moon & Carley, 2007). This line of research 
has contributed to a greater understanding of the structure and internal dynamics 
of network resilience (Carley, 2006). However, this focus on internal dynamics has 
left underexplored the embeddedness of networks within particular historical, 
social, political, and cultural circumstances. In the case of trafficking in “blood diamonds” 
in Sierra Leone and Liberia, for instance, Raab and Milward (2003) found 
that many of the major actors had been trained in terrorist training camps run by 
Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya in the 1970s and 1980s. Twenty years later, these 
actors joined a network that both terrorized the local population and made a great 
deal of money from the diamond mines of Sierra Leone that they controlled, and 
they were able to smuggle the gems to Europe. In turn, to equip their militias, the 
traffickers entered into the network of international arms traders (Raab & Milward, 
2003). Such a rich contextual understanding of dark networks is necessary to 
understand why they continue to persist even when their organizational structures 
come under repeated attack. 
 
The second line of research on dark networks, which we call the “descriptive/ 
historical approach,” does, in contrast, aim to describe dark networks and their evolution 
as thoroughly as possible, emphasizing an in-depth contextual understanding 
based on wide and diverse empirical information (e.g., Sageman, 2004, 2008). 
This approach has made important contributions to the empirical understanding of 
current radical Islamic terrorist networks. Research utilizing this approach, however, 
has generally stopped short of embedding its findings in a unifying theoretical 
framework that contributes to theoretically informed generalizations on similarities 
and differences within the universe of dark networks, which is a strong point of 
the work within the network analytic approach (Borgatti, 2006; Carley, 2006). 
In the present paper we attempt to complement network-analytic and descriptive/ 
historical approaches by combining a rich contextual understanding of the ways 
dark networks have evolved and been socially as well as historically embedded with 
interpretations based in the unifying perspective of organization theory. The goal of 
this endeavor is to develop a set of policy recommendations that are based on a thorough 
understanding of the factors that render dark networks more or less resilient. 
 
DARK NETWORK RESILIENCE 
 
Dark networks (as opposed to “bright” networks) are covert and illegal (Milward & 
Raab, 2006). Although dark and bright are metaphors, and admittedly are normatively 
biased, we mean empirically that “a bright network is legal and visible and a 
dark network is illegal and tries to be as invisible as possible” (Milward & Raab, 
2006, p. 334). Two dimensions thus stand out in differentiating dark networks from 
bright: visibility and legality. Visibility refers to how easily network activity is discerned 
without investigative effort. The second dimension, legality, refers to the laws 
of the state, not to whether a network’s goals are morally lamentable (Milward & 
Raab, 2006). In the present paper, we are interested in the resilience of such networks 
and why some dark networks are more resilient than others. Next, we will 
elaborate the state of the art in dark network resilience and highlight its conceptualization 
and operationalization on the basis of prior work. 
 
Conceptualization 
 
The existing work on network resilience shares some important commonalities. 
First, resilience is a dynamic process, associated with systems that persist and perform 
their primary tasks under pressure from exogenous shocks (Batabyal, 2002; 
Holling et al., 1995; Moberg & Folke, 1999). Sutcliff and Vogus (2003), in one of the 
few conceptual contributions on resilience in organization studies, see two critical 
conditions implicit in the notion of resilience: “exposure to threat, stress, or adversity, 
as well as the achievement of positive adaptation in spite of the stress or adversity 
encountered” (p. 108). Second, the type of process by which a system responds to 
shocks can have important explanatory power for understanding resilience (Holling 
et al., 1995; Pimm, 1984). Third, resilience can manifest itself in two different 
process patterns: a robustness function in which a system absorbs external stress 
and keeps functioning despite shocks, and a rebounding function in which systems 
are indeed affected by shocks but are able to bounce back from these shocks by 
transforming themselves (Moberg & Folke, 1999). Fourth, there are antecedents 
that make some systems more resilient than others, and there are different kinds of 
shocks with different repercussions for network resilience. In ecosystems, for example, 
chronic, exogenous pressure is detrimental to system resilience (Moberg & 
Folke, 1999). In social networks, on the other hand, it has been proposed that scalefree 
networks with a skewed connectivity distribution are nonresilient to deliberate 
attack by an informed actor (Albert, Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000). Such an informed 
actor can locate key players whose removal would diminish the cohesiveness of a 
network the most (Borgatti, 2006). 
 
Based on the above, we define dark network resilience as a dark network’s ability 
to either remain operational in the midst of shocks or attacks (“robustness capacity”) 
or to bounce back from untoward events by transforming itself over time 
(“rebounding capacity”). 
 
Operationalization 
 
We operationalize dark network resilience as a latent construct that can be observed 
from the network’s pattern of operational activity. Operational activity refers to the 
extent to which a dark network is able to perform the tasks it was set up to accomplish, 
as demonstrated in observable activities (such as bombings, acts of sabotage, 
assassinations). Operational activity also refers to the operational output or “measurable 
performance” of the dark network. In line with the definition provided, a dark 
network demonstrates resilience through its response to attacks and untoward 
events, which refer to endogenous and exogenous shocks to the network. 
A shock is, in line with previous research, best thought of as an event that results in 
“a sudden, dramatic increase in uncertainty” (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990, p. 105) within 
the network. For example, the assets of a dark network could be seized, the leadership 
or a large part of its active members could be arrested or killed, or communication 
lines could suddenly be severed. Such shocks can lead to a radical change, an 
existential threat, or simply increase the level of uncertainty. Prior research has 
demonstrated that organizational networks thrive if they can maintain a certain level 
of stability (Provan & Milward, 1995), suggesting that shocks can make an organizational 
network less operationally active. We thus conceptualize uncertainty as a general 
contingency characteristic of the network and operationally define it as the 
degree of information available to the network about actions of outside actors or 
unpredictable environmental elements that are likely to affect the network. It should 
be noted that the degree of uncertainty is dependent on the information processing 
capacity of an organizational network (Aldrich, 2008). In the case of a sudden shock 
or attack like the arrest of the leadership of a dark network, it becomes much more 
important, but also much harder, for a dark network to receive adequate information, 
process it, and adequately predict the actions of the state. 
 
Thus, we posit that organizational networks must be able to buffer or mitigate the 
uncertainty following a shock or attack if they are to maintain a certain level of stability 
(i.e., robustness) or be able to reestablish a relatively stable structure after a 
shock (i.e., rebound). In each of the three cases we analyzed for this study, a nation 
state struck a serious blow against a dark network that could potentially have led to 
its demise.  
 
  
Figure 1 presents a stylized and highly simplified explanatory heuristic 
of how the level of operational activity of networks captures their resilience. 
We assume a certain level of operational activity at T  1 and a shock occurring 
at T0. First, after the shock, there may be little change in the network’s level of operational 
activity (T1 showing a relatively unchanged level of operational activity). 
This effect is similar to a healthy human body fighting off a viral infection. Thus, 
despite a considerable impact on the human body (change of its internal chemistry), 
the consequence for the operational activity is small. This pattern of operational 
activity corresponds to the network as being robust (Figure 1). 
 
A second possible pattern occurs when the level of operational activity drops 
severely after a shock at T0 (a significantly lower level of operational activity at T1), 
but it is able to bounce back from the shock after some time (T2) by rebounding to 
a level of operational activity close to that prior to the shock. This pattern of operational 
activity corresponds to the rebounding dimension of resilience (Figure 1). 
Clearly, both robust and rebounding patterns of operational activity indicate 
resilient dark networks. 
 
The third pattern of operational activity occurs when the level of operational 
activity initially drops after the shock (T1) and never recovers from it (exhibiting an 
equally low or lower level of operational activity at T2; see Figure 1). These networks 
are virtually destroyed after the shock and are likely to dissolve. This pattern 
of operational activity corresponds to networks being nonresilient to shocks. 
We acknowledge that the patterns in Figure 1 are simplified and merely intended as 
illustrating resilience, its measurement, and its different dimensions. In reality, many 
more patterns are possible, from concave-shaped curves to levels of operational activity 
that display complex patterns combining characteristics of different dimensions of 
resilience through multiple shocks and then perhaps, after some inflection point, 
becoming nonresilient. Addressing all these possibilities is a task beyond the scope of 
this early attempt to systematically address dark network resilience. However, we will 
demonstrate that as an explanatory heuristic, this initial model has a purpose. The 
empirical elaboration, which we turn to next, renders it more concrete. 
 
METHODS 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of why some dark networks are resilient 
while others are not, we undertook a comparative case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) of three actual dark networks. 
 
Case Selection 
We applied what Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) refer to as “theoretical sampling”: 
cases were selected because they were particularly suitable for illuminating and 
extending relationships and logic among constructs. In our selection process, we 
actively sought covert and illegal networks of which we could trace the operational 
activity over time, and which experienced an exogenous shock or radical change. 
A crucial consideration was to focus the case selection on the variable of interest, dark 
network resilience. In order to ensure variability on this concept, we selected one longlasting 
dark network that in the end was nonresilient and two resilient networks— 
one where initial analyses revealed a robust pattern of operational activity and one 
that displayed a rebounding pattern. We are well aware of the dangers of selecting cases 
based on the dependent variable. In qualitative comparative studies with a small N, 
however, researchers often assert that in terms of design, the risk of choosing cases so 
similar to one another that there is limited variability in causal variables, and thus 
limited room to draw conclusions in terms of effects, is greater than the risk of cases 
being selected on the dependent variable that would confirm hypotheses (e.g., King, 
Keohane, & Verba, 1994). Specifically, in our application of theoretical sampling, we 
avoided the bias of selecting cases that would confirm certain expectations by assuring 
that the scores on the independent variables were unknown prior to the analysis. 
For our analysis, we selected Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the 
African National Congress (ANC); the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC); and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
 
One might question to what extent these cases represent networks rather than 
organizations. We agree with Mayntz (2004, p. 8) that clandestine groups always 
have certain network and organizational characteristics, albeit in different ratios, 
which is no different than many organizations that are heavily networked, such as 
major crime squads that may draw on the resources of several different community 
police departments. Markets, networks, and hierarchies, as governance forms, 
represent ideal types that more often than not appear in some mixed form in empirical 
reality (Raab, 2004). In addition, the specific mixture is also likely to change 
over time as organizational forms tend to formalize when they increase in size. We 
can nonetheless use the criteria that Mayntz (2004) suggests for analyzing clandestine 
organizational forms in order to assess whether a group bears more resemblance 
to a network or a hierarchical organization. These criteria are the extent to 
which a role structure is in place distinct from the actual membership of a clandestine 
group (i.e., to what extent tasks and functions are independent of specific individuals); 
the extent to which these groups are bounded (i.e., membership is clear, 
for example, by the application of a formal act of initiation); the extent to which they 
are internally differentiated both in a horizontal and a vertical direction; and the 
extent to which there are institutionalized lines of command. Thus, a clandestine 
group would be classified more as a dark network (rather than an organization) 
the more the role structure was dependent on actual membership, the more fluid the 
borders were, the less it was vertically differentiated, and the less the lines of command 
were institutionalized. Applying these criteria, we conclude that all three of 
our cases have elements of both; the FARC and especially MK weighed in more 
heavily toward the network side, the LTTE more on the organization side. The latter 
showed strong elements of a vertically differentiated organization with institutionalized 
lines of command and control and a role structure independent of the 
actual membership, especially in the territories it controlled and where it had 
become a quasi-state. But the LTTE also had network elements, for example, in the 
form of sleeper cells and support networks in Sri Lankan cities where membership 
was more fluid and differentiation more horizontal. Both the FARC and, especially 
in the beginning, MK had specific role structures dependent on their membership; 
MK was very much dependent on specific persons as inspirational leaders. We 
think, however, that a more important issue than qualifying a clandestine group as 
either a network or an organization concerns the question of whether such a characterization 
would make a difference in relation to resilience (Mayntz, 2004). This 
is a theme to which we will return in the concluding section of this article. 
 
Data Collection 
Between December 2006 and July 2010, we took a broad approach toward gathering 
data, collecting it from as many sources and of as many kinds as possible 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The very characteristics constituting dark networks (being illegal 
and covert) reinforce the need for data triangulation, as dark networks are hard 
to study directly. There are, however, a host of secondary data sources available for 
analysis. Mayntz (2004, p. 5) has stressed that secondary sources (such as court 
transcripts, interrogation protocols, and governmental agency reports), “show a 
surprising degree of correspondence.” Besides these sources (elaborated in more 
detail as follows), we consulted widely with intelligence experts from around the 
world on the nature of the three networks that we studied. 
Most data on MK was collected through submissions by the ANC to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, which has in turn documented MK’s history, 
operational activity, and historical facts in exchange for amnesty for all who testified, 
as long as they told the truth. As such, many of MK’s internal documents are, 
perhaps surprisingly, open to the public and included in our analysis. We found that 
the FARC is primarily documented in newspaper reports and historical accounts, 
as the United States’ “War on Drugs” sparked global news coverage and investigation 
of the FARC. This resulted in a host of useful data. In addition, the FARC’s official Web 
site counters much of the U.S.-based newsgathering, and forms a valuable source of 
information as well. We found that the LTTE has been elaborately studied by international 
scholars, and many secondary sources are available. In addition, the recent 
destruction of the LTTE received considerable coverage in the international press. 
The pool of accumulated data (which comprised many megabytes and thousands of 
pages of documents) was then coded and analyzed by a team of researchers through 
conventional content analysis, using the NVivo software program. 
 
Analytic Approach 
Since little is known about the antecedents that underlie dark network resilience, 
our orientation toward data analysis was exploratory, with the earlier stages being 
more open than later stages. Our method of analysis drew mainly on work by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Miles and Huberman (1994). This approach entailed 
continuous comparison of data and concepts throughout the analysis phase. Since 
in this study data analysis followed data collection, we traveled back and forth 
between data and theory, and, later in the process, between emerging concepts and 
evidence (Locke, 2001). 
 
Data was coded through a process of content analysis, in which important concepts 
were labeled as they emerged from the data. As is common in case studies, 
this involved a flexible, iterative process with many returns to previously coded text. 
To make this process more transparent, consider the following example of fragments 
taken from the documents that we analyzed when studying the MK case: 
In November 1980 the ANC declared its adherence to the Geneva Conventions. In his 
statement at this time, Oliver Tambo said: We have always defined the enemy in terms of a 
system of domination and not of a people or a race. . . . As we have done in the past, so shall 
we continue, consistently and unreservedly, to support, fight for and abide by the principles 
of international law. (Tambo, 1980) 
 
We highlighted this statement in the first reading, merely because it seemed an 
important event in the history of MK. In NVivo this meant making a new “node” 
(a type of subject marker), which we first labeled “Geneva Conventions.” In further 
reading, the following passage caught our attention: 
 
In its strategy and tactics, the ANC put politics at the fore, and it defined itself and its army, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, as an instrument of a people in political motion; the barrel of the gun 
as one of the means—and not the means, least of all, an end in itself. It mobilised the people 
to revolt in an organised fashion; it mobilised the international community to act decisively 
against apartheid. (ANC, 1997) 
The last phrase—“mobilised the international community to act decisively against 
apartheid”—linked this passage to the first. It made us realize that a possible reason 
MK was so eager to sign the Geneva Conventions, as in many of their other 
actions, was to appear as a legitimate force and to gain international support. In 
NVivo we highlighted this fragment and added it to the preexisting node, “Geneva 
Conventions.” We changed the label to “Geneva Conventions/International support 
lobby?” In further reading, the next passage completed the link: 
The legitimacy and legality of this struggle were written in numerous covenants of 
theinternational community. (ANC, 1997) 
This passage linked all three bits of text together by stating the overarching phenomenon 
of interest: legitimacy. Apparently, for MK, coming across as legitimate in 
order to gain the support of the international community was very important. 
Therefore, we highlighted this third passage and added it to the same node. The 
node was subsequently relabeled “Legitimacy.” In a similar fashion, all important 
passages from all documents were read, highlighted, labeled with nodes, and relabeled 
when subsequent passages gave rise to the need to do so. 
A critical part of coding the data concerned the indicator for resilience, namely 
operational activity. As mentioned, we operationalized the concept of operational 
activity as the extent to which a dark network performs the tasks it was designed 
for at the network level, as evidenced in observable activities (Provan & Milward, 
1995). We culled the data on operational activity not only from the number of 
attacks, but also from studying newspaper clippings, background analyses, and 
court transcripts, including eyewitness accounts and insider perspectives. The 
types of activities we coded in the data as being operational activities concern, for 
instance, bombings and acts of sabotage recorded by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (in the case of MK), kidnappings and military attacks 
by the FARC and the LTTE, and suicide bombings by the LTTE, all of which were 
reported in secondary sources and newspapers. As is characteristic of qualitative 
research, we stayed close to the data, aiming to gain a rich understanding of the 
cases. In so doing, we could go beyond a mere count variable of operational activity, 
indicating only the number of attacks, as one would expect in quantitative 
research. In contrast, we came to the curves in our models from a qualitatively 
developed contextual understanding of the operational activity of the cases, not 
just in number per se, but also in scope and sophistication. A high incidence of 
operational activity at a given point in time thus indicates a point at which the 
dark network undertook either a lot of operations or a few high-impact operations. 
 
RESULTS 
Within-Case Analysis 
From the analytic approach described, we drew up thick descriptions of each case. 
What follows is a condensed summary of the background of each case. Table 1 summarizes 
the descriptive features of each case. 
 
 Table 1. Overview of cases by descriptive information. 
 
Case 1: MK 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation” or MK for short) was the active military 
wing of the African National Congress (ANC) fighting against the South African 
apartheid regime between 1961 and 1990. The goal of MK was to overthrow 
the apartheid regime through grassroots warfare, from sabotage and guerrilla operations 
to insurgency and revolution. 
Immediately after its inception, MK’s level of operational activity steadily rose. Those 
early operations mostly consisted of bombings of a rudimentary nature, with no 
human casualties (Williams, 2000). As a response to this sabotage campaign, the South 
African government immediately classified MK a terrorist organization and banned it 
(Mandela, 2002a), an action that resulted in high levels of environmental uncertainty. 
In addition, the South African regime went to considerable lengths to infiltrate agents 
within MK and every effort was made to destroy it (ANC, 1997, p. 3.3). 
The upward trend in the number and sophistication of operations undertaken by 
MK was cut off abruptly when MK experienced a tremendous shock two years into 
its existence. One night when the entire MK High Command was gathered at a single 
location, the police raided the property. This coup, known as the “Rivonia Raid,” 
resulted in an incredible shock, since in one fell swoop, the police had captured 
Nelson Mandela and the entire MK leadership. This shock posed a radical change 
to operations. Not only was virtually every member of the command structure suddenly 
arrested, detained, and jailed for life; with this loss, MK’s underground structure in 
South Africa was suddenly headless. The members who had to assume command 
had limited experience and limited access to information about other members 
and resources, as existing command ties had been severed. This huge shock staggered 
MK and dramatically increased the amount of uncertainty that remaining 
network members had to contend with in order to ensure MK’s survival, and 
their own. 
With the arrest of the key members of MK’s High Command, its armed actions 
inside South Africa were largely terminated (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
2003, p. 274). This did not mean, however, that MK ceased to exist completely; the 
motivation to one day overthrow apartheid was still present. The few members of 
MK’s command structure who had evaded capture left the country (ANC, 1997) and 
founded a mission in exile. 
By the late 1960s, MK slowly started to rebound (Mandela, 2002b). This was 
largely due to MK gaining international support and resources outside of South 
Africa, as the apartheid regime increasingly lost legitimacy, particularly after government 
killings in the infamous 1976 Soweto Uprising (ANC, 1997). The actions 
undertaken by the police caused much anger and disgust in South Africa as well as 
internationally and, in the aftermath of the riots, a fire of mass resistance was ignited. 
Thousands of students left South Africa for adjacent countries to join and train 
with MK as a vehicle to channel their anger and desire to fight apartheid. As a consequence, 
between 1977 and 1980, MK’s operational activity dramatically increased. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission report concludes that, from 1976 to 
1984, there was a steady incremental growth in armed attacks, with approximately 
265 recorded incidents. Between 1985 and 1988, MK activity inside South Africa 
peaked. The number of incidents increased from 44 in 1984, to 136 in 1985, to 228 
in 1986. Numbers of attacks continued to soar, with 242 incidents in 1987, and 
peaked in 1988 with 300 incidents (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003, 
p. 275). 
By the late 1980s, MK actions, coupled with nationwide unrest and protests, rendered 
South Africa largely ungovernable. As a consequence, in 1990 the government 
relented, and began to dismantle the apartheid system. In February 1990, MK was 
unbanned and thus ceased to exist as a dark network. The ideal for which it 
had strived had been achieved (Motumi, 1994), and there was no longer a legitimate 
reason for its existence. In August of the same year, after an estimated 1,745 operations 
in South Africa and 29 years of armed struggle, MK suspended operations. 
The level of MK resilience is graphically represented in Figure 2. 
 
 
Case 2: FARC 
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) is a Marxist guerrilla 
army, operating mainly in Colombia. It was founded in 1966 and continues to be 
active.1 We studied the FARC in depth through 2006 because, as described below, 
this time period was sufficient to evaluate the consequences of the shock caused by 
the increased military effort by the Colombian government in 1999. The FARC is 
both illegal (it is on the U.S. and EU lists of foreign terrorist networks) and has to 
act covertly (it is under constant pressure from the Colombian military). 
 
The initial goals of the FARC were redistribution of land, overthrow of a government 
they viewed as elitist and corrupt, and reclamation of Colombia’s independence 
from “the Empire” (the U.S.). Following the FARC’s founding in 1966, its level 
of operational activity remained fairly low: “[T]he insurgents remained largely ‘out 
there,’ out of sight, out of mind . . . no one much cared” (Marks, 2003, p. 79). The 
FARC only became a concern when it linked up with drug production as a funding 
source after a 1982 FARC conference: “[T]he money from, initially, taxation of the 
drug trade, later, direct involvement in it, provided a resource windfall which made 
previously marginal political actors into central figures” (Marks, 2003, p. 78). 
Because of the resources from its entanglement in narcotics, the FARC was able 
to increase their insurgent activity to the point that the government negotiated a 
cease-fire with them in 1984. The FARC was allowed to create a legitimate political 
party, the communist Unión Patriótica (UP), which could have been the FARC’s 
entry into a nonviolent struggle to take over the Colombian state at the ballot box. 
However, as the UP gained more and more public support, it became a target of 
right-wing paramilitaries and drug cartels. As a consequence, by the late 1980s, 
almost the entire UP had been annihilated, with 3,500 of its members either murdered 
or missing (Pardo, 2000). Later, the FARC frequently used this systematic 
killing of their political wing to legitimize the use of violent means to attain their 
goals. 
In the second half of the 1990s, the FARC’s strength was reflected in its level of 
operational activity. Besides an increase in kidnapping and narcotics operations, 
this period witnessed the FARC’s most intensive and sophisticated operations to 
date (Marks, 2003). As a consequence of the FARC’s sudden increase in operational 
activity, a peace agreement was reached, and the government of Colombia granted 
the FARC a 42,000-square-kilometer demilitarized zone. The FARC used their newfound 
freedom to arrange kidnappings, carry out summary executions, and boost 
their coca production. Controlling the zone boosted the FARC’s level of operational 
activity. By 1996 some estimate the FARC’s ranks had swollen to around 14,000 
combatants (Richani, 1997). 
In 1999 the FARC experienced a shock when the United States agreed to fund the 
$1.3 billion Plan Colombia, which focused on the provision of military assistance 
and helicopters to eradicate coca fields in FARC territory (Shifter, 1999) and military 
operations aimed directly at engaging the FARC. It resulted in the capture and 
death of FARC members, severing vital communication lines. The government’s 
increased attention to finding and following suspected members forced the FARC 
to spend more resources on staying covert and limited its access to information. 
In assessing the consequence of the Plan Colombia shock on the level of operational 
activity of the FARC, the only conclusion can be that the FARC was remarkably 
resilient. First, although the enormous budget, prosecution, and eradication 
efforts would lead one to believe otherwise, Plan Colombia did little, if anything, to 
harm the narcotics industry in Colombia or the FARC. There is widespread consensus 
that since the inception of Plan Colombia, coca cultivation in Colombia actually 
increased—a situation for which the FARC’s resilience is partly responsible 
(Sweig, 2002). In addition, the FARC’s level of operational activity outside of the 
narcotics industry remained equally high after Plan Colombia, and has since 1999 
included several highly sophisticated attacks, including the kidnapping of presidential 
candidate Ingrid Betancourt (Marks, 2003). Thus, Plan Colombia did not make 
a dent in the number of FARC combatants; the number of members actually steadily 
increased to an estimated 30,000 by 2004. The FARC’s level of resilience is graphically 
represented in Figure 3. 
 Case 3: LTTE 
The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) was a militant group of the Tamil people 
in Sri Lanka, striving against the Sri Lankan government for independence and 
recognition of the Tamil population and language (Cronin, 2009). The LTTE began 
peacefully in the early 1970s. It was only when a man named Prabhakaran took over 
leadership in 1975 that the LTTE decided to pursue their own homeland as a separate 
state (Tamil Eelam) by means other than politics (Cronin, 2009). The first attack of 
the LTTE toward the mostly Sinhalese Sri Lankan government took place in 1978 
when an Air Ceylon passenger jet was bombed (Voorde, 2005). Then, in 1979, the 
Sri Lankan government adopted the Prevention of Terrorism Act as a response to 
this act of terrorism and the increasing popularity of the LTTE among the Tamil 
population. The LTTE benefited from the Act, as it further isolated Tamil civilians 
from the Sri Lankan government and pushed them into the arms of the LTTE 
(Linden, 2009). The conflict further intensified as the government burned down 
Jaffna Library, the headquarters of the LTTE (Gombrich, 2006), and escalated 
when, in June 1983, Sri Lankan president Jayewardene called for the Sinhalese 
community to prevent the LTTE from taking root in areas other than the Tamil 
parts of the country. At that time, the LTTE had begun actively recruiting and training 
fighters. As there was a lot of respect for the LTTE among the Tamil people 
(Mayilvaganan, 2009), many Tamils were eager to join Prabhakaran and believed 
that the LTTE was the only way to create an independent Tamil state. The LTTE 
recruited primarily in the poor north and eastern portions of the country, not only 
because most of the inhabitants there were Tamil, but because of the high levels of 
poverty, disillusionment, and hatred toward the government in those areas. Since 
the LTTE was seen as the solution to Sinhala oppression, recruitment and fundraising 
activities did not have to be violent; they displayed films at schools, showing 
their successes, and LTTE members would occasionally visit individual houses to 
convince people of their cause or ask for money (Lilja, 2009). 
In addition to propaganda against the Sri Lankan government and in favor of the 
LTTE, the network restricted people from leaving the Tamil area in order to prevent 
information leaks and create a catchment area for recruitment (Goodhand, 
Hulme, & Lewer, 2000). Over many years, the battle between the government and 
the LTTE became increasingly violent, ranging from covert guerrilla tactics and suicide 
bombings (a tactic that the LTTE developed into its trademark; Voorde, 2005, 
p. 182) to all-out warfare that only occasionally subsided during cease fires. There 
were a total of 1,253 violent incidents between 1979 and the end of 2008 reported 
by the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism, 2010). 
Although innumerable events have shaped the fate of the LTTE, the shock that 
sent them into a downward spiral was an increased military effort by the newly 
elected Sri Lankan government that started in the summer of 2006 and intensified 
in 2008 when it officially renounced the cease fire agreement and declared all-out 
war on the LTTE (Tigers’ Last Stand, 2009). With this act, the government 
[was] signaling its intent to unleash the military to extirpate once and for all the LTTE and 
their strongholds. Sri Lankan officials were convinced that constructive negotiations were 
impossible and believed the 2002 ceasefire agreement constrained their ability to militarily 
engage the LTTE in order to force concessions. (Linden, 2009, p. 15) 
Ironically, the new Sri Lankan government came to power at least in part because 
the LTTE had called for Tamils to boycott the elections, and Prabhakaran failed to 
recognize that the new government wanted to seek a military rather than political 
solution and aimed to completely eradicate the LTTE (Anderson, 2011, pp. 47–49). 
After its withdrawal from the cease fire, the government launched an attack in 
January 2009 on Elephant Pass, which the LTTE had taken during fights in 1991. 
The pass was of great importance to the LTTE because it formed the link between 
the Jaffna Peninsula and the rest of the island of Sri Lanka. This setback hit the 
LTTE hard on a psychological level and damaged its legitimacy and reputation for 
effective fighting. Despite the loss of territory, the LTTE managed to nominally 
replace the losses it had suffered since 2006 and even increased the number of combatants 
to 7,500 by the end of the war in 2009. As the LTTE retreated, the Tamil 
population fell back as well. This made it easier for the LTTE to forcibly recruit 
young men and boys as the population was being pushed back into a more and 
more crowded peninsula. In 2008, 90 percent of the 7,000 combatants had been 
forcefully recruited, among them many children.2 
By 2009, only a small part of Sri Lanka was in the hands of the LTTE, and as the 
government had blocked the main routes to that region, there was no way to operate 
from there. At that point the government forces drove the remaining LTTE fighters 
to the sea. In a brutal last assault with much loss of civilian life, the government 
killed the remaining LTTE fighters (Anderson, 2011), including Prabhakaran and 
other leading LTTE figures (Where Next, 2009). The Sri Lankan government 
declared victory on May 19 after the LTTE finally surrendered and put down their 
arms (Where Next, 2009). 
From a military standpoint and the perspective of the Sri Lankan government, the 
defeat of the Tamil Tigers can be seen as a success. However, the government 
achieved this result with a strategy that first denied access to the media, the United 
Nations, and human rights groups (Anderson, 2011, p. 43). Later, after 2006, the 
government’s success was based on a strategy of completely destroying the LTTE by 
killing the LTTE fighters as quickly as possible, as well as acting to “segregate and 
terrify the survivors” (Anderson, 2011, p. 43). The LTTE’s level of resilience is graphically 
represented in Figure 4. 
 Cross-Case Analysis 
A number of important variables emerged from our analysis of the three cases that 
allow us to understand why some dark networks are more resilient than others. The 
logic is as follows: We assume a process that plays out over several time periods (T  1 
to T2) (see Figure 1). At T0, a shock occurs, which impacts the dark network. At any 
given point in time, a network is assumed to have some level of what we deem 
important network characteristics. These determine the network’s networked capability, 
that is, the ability to over time attract, maintain, and replace actors who for some reason have 
ceased to be part of the network (e.g., through capture, death, or 
desertion), and the extent to which the network can balance its ability to integrate 
actors enough to maintain common purpose with a loosening of its structure so 
that it will not be destroyed in one stroke (as almost happened to the MK at the 
Rivonia Raid). In organization studies this is referred to as the balance between 
integration and differentiation, which is, in essence, an instrumental process of 
finding the right mix between specialization of tasks and skills and the means to 
reintegrate them to create operational activity under the conditions of covertness 
and illegality. Together, network characteristics and networked capability result in 
a certain level of operational activity. We will now explain how these variables 
emerged from the cases and how they are related to resilience, and draw propositions 
from them. 
 
Network Characteristics 
Network characteristics vary between networks. These are characteristics that 
change as the result of a shock and which in turn have an effect on networked capabilities. 
In our case analyses, resources and legitimacy appeared to be among the 
most important characteristics of networks in impacting their resilience. 
 
Resources 
Resources refer to the amount of assets a dark network has at its disposal. These 
include all sorts of material resources, such as physical space as well as cyberspace, 
access to technology, finances, and weapons.3 The importance of resources became 
explicitly evident from the FARC and LTTE cases. One of the greatest resources of 
the LTTE was its control of a large territory on the island of Sri Lanka. From this 
territory they could raise funds, recruit and train people, as well as plan attacks on 
the Sri Lankan government. In a safe territory it is also much easier to maintain an 
integrated structure supportive of a common purpose. In territory controlled by the 
enemy, the converse is necessary to avoid detection and destruction. After the battle 
of Elephant Pass, the LTTE lost control of most of its territory, which was its 
most valuable resource. This led to a downward spiral from which the LTTE could 
not recover. In addition, the LTTE was able to raise considerable funds from the 
Tamil diaspora in Western countries, both through regular fund-raising activities 
and through intimidation and extortion (Human Rights Watch, 2006). 
The FARC only became a serious player after it became entangled in the narcotics 
industry and gained a growing source of funding (Marks, 2003). In other words, it 
was only when the FARC started its narcotics trafficking that the level of operational 
activity increased due to the increase in resources at its disposal. The U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) states that, “Drug trafficking is the 
lifeblood of the FARC because it enables the FARC to acquire weapons, ammunition 
and equipment necessary to carry on its violent attacks” (DEA, 2007). These 
resources could attract new recruits, not for ideological reasons, but for the 
prospect of escaping poverty. Although the FARC has always denied direct involvement 
in the narcotics industry, the FARC’s income from the drug trade is often estimated 
at between $400 million and $500 million annually, placing its total revenue 
at $900 million annually (Bagley, 2001). 
Resources not only benefit the network directly (for instance, when buying 
weapons helps to execute attacks, or financial resources are used to bribe officials) 
but indirectly as well. The FARC was able to use its financial resources to acquire 
high-tech equipment—all paid for with drug revenues—that allowed them to communicate 
and coordinate their activities. More resources thus seem to increase the 
portfolio of options a dark network has to (1) strengthen its network structure by 
creating and replacing actors through promises of financial wealth and (2) create 
linkages that allow for alternative means of communication. Human capital also 
helps a dark network to balance integration and differentiation (Raab & Milward, 
2003). If, for example, a shock has seriously disrupted existing communication 
channels, human capital resources allow the dark network to revise strategies, coordinate 
activities, and find alternative communication channels. If mobile phones 
and e-mail traffic are being monitored, money can pay for couriers to transmit messages 
by hand or to hire specialists who know how to encrypt messages in code that 
is difficult to break. This is an example of how resources can provide alternative 
integrative mechanisms if others are compromised. 
Financial resources can also motivate members of the network. In the case of the 
FARC, it was clear that the dark network’s entanglement with drug trafficking eroded 
some of its legitimacy, but in return made it possible to “buy” support among the 
population. Even as its legitimacy waned, the number of recruits grew, especially 
since there were few other options. In failed and failing states, dark networks often 
constitute one of the few employment opportunities for entrepreneurial young men 
(Raab & Milward, 2003). It follows that a dark network’s ability to replace nodes 
and linkages will be enhanced if it is able to provide employment opportunities in 
areas with few other alternatives: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Resources have a positive effect on a dark network’s capabilities (replacing 
nodes and linkages and balancing integration/differentiation). 
 
Legitimacy 
The second important network characteristic we found that plays a part in the 
resilience of dark networks concerns legitimacy. We refer to legitimacy as “a generalized 
perception that the actions, activities and structure of a network are desirable 
and appropriate” (Human & Provan, 2000, p. 328). Further, we can distinguish 
internal and external legitimacy (Human & Provan, 2000). Internal legitimacy refers 
to the acceptance of the dark network as an entity, including its goals and means, 
by its individual members. External legitimacy refers to the perception that important 
support groups outside the network have about the dark network as an entity, 
including its goals and means. If dark networks are seen as justified and appropriate, 
they enjoy a high level of external legitimacy among these groups. The risk of 
detection associated with a dark network’s covert and illegal status results in a level 
of uncertainty that is quite different from that of bright networks. To persuade an 
individual to take the risk to support it and thereby accept a highly unpredictable 
existence, any dark network needs to focus on appearing highly legitimate (acceptable, 
appropriate) to its members. Without resources or a sufficient level of internal 
legitimacy among its members, no one would continue to risk their life by being a 
part of a group that operates illegally and covertly. 
The three cases demonstrate that legitimacy comprises more than merely a potential 
problem, and can be pursued as a conscious strategy by a dark network. 
Legitimacy is contested, and if one were to look at actions by a dark network and 
its government opponent, a great deal of effort would be seen going into making the 
other side look illegitimate. In many ways this tension over legitimacy is at the heart 
of the struggle for the hearts and minds of the larger community. What is legitimate 
is to a large extent in the eye of the beholder, and not fixed to any external standard. 
Legitimacy is very important in all three of the cases at hand, but perhaps can be 
observed most clearly in MK. MK always gave high priority to legitimacy. This had 
two main causes, the first being the strong ethical principles present in the ANC 
(Williams, 2000). MK understood that soldiers “will only enjoy the support of the 
people if they have moral and political legitimacy” (Ngculu, 2003, p. 247). 
Legitimacy was also important to the ANC more broadly, as legitimacy allowed 
them to raise support and resources abroad and it helped recruitment and training 
at home (Mandela, 2002a). Internally, MK required all new recruits, especially in 
later stages of the struggle, to be politically educated by commissars so that all its 
members would know that they were there to fight apartheid and that they were liberators 
rather than terrorists, and so that illegitimate actions taken by the state 
could be communicated (and exaggerated) to all members. 
Besides internal legitimacy, external legitimacy—that is, the generalized perception 
among groups of stakeholders other than the network members that the 
actions, activities, and structure of the network are desirable and appropriate— 
turns out to be important as well. MK, together with its political wing, the ANC, 
pursued external legitimacy to the largest extent. Their strategy took the form of 
international lobbying for support and efforts to appear as a legitimate army to outside 
groups, for instance by signing the Geneva Convention, by keeping a strict code 
of conduct, and by conveying the message that they made every effort to avoid loss of 
civilian life (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003). 
In the LTTE case, the gradual loss of external legitimacy played an important role 
in explaining its demise. While the efforts of the Sri Lankan government led to heavy 
losses among the LTTE fighters, especially from 2008 on, these efforts came at a time 
when the LTTE had already faced several years of declining external legitimacy stemming 
from both their loss of territory and the international condemnation of their 
suicide bombing tactics, which resonated very poorly after September 11, 2001. 
The LTTE’s internal legitimacy had been suffering at the same time. After the LTTE 
broke numerous cease fires with the government of Sri Lanka and failed to negotiate 
in good faith for a solution that would give the Tamils much of what they had 
been fighting for, Colonel Karuna, one of the most important members of the LTTE, 
realized that Prabhakaran did not want to negotiate for a possible political solution, 
and he left, taking approximately 6,000 of the LTTE’s best troops with him. This was 
a huge blow to the LTTE, since it meant the loss of about 50 percent of its resource 
base.4 This split within the LTTE and internal feuding, which occurred in 2004, “seriously 
called into question LTTE’s claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil people” 
(Bullion, 2005, p. 6) After September 11, many governments’ perceptions of the 
LTTE had radically changed—from seeing them as freedom fighters to seeing them 
as terrorists. This changed perspective led to a crackdown on the LTTE’s international 
fund-raising activities, with far-reaching consequences to its operational capacity 
(Cronin, 2009). The U.S. government, for example, helped the Sri Lankan government 
with satellite intelligence to sink LTTE ships that were carrying weapons in the 
Indian Ocean (Anderson, 2011, p. 48). Prabhakaran nonetheless failed to recognize 
the changed international environment and the dramatically decreased legitimacy 
of the LTTE and believed, in the end, “that the international relief community, the 
U.N., and Western governments would save the Tigers” (Anderson, 2011, p. 48). 
As a consequence of the changed international environment, the LTTE had fewer 
financial resources at its disposal to buy weapons or recruit new members on a voluntary 
basis. Lilja (2009), in a thorough analysis of LTTE recruitment practices, 
demonstrated how recruitment initially relied on winning the hearts and minds of 
the population, but later resorted increasingly to passive coercion methods in the 
form of entrapment or the forced recruitment of child soldiers. The latter practice 
was criticized by UNICEF, and considerably reduced their internal legitimacy within 
the territory they controlled.5 
We therefore argue that the levels of internal and external legitimacy of a dark 
network have a positive effect on its ability to replace nodes and linkages. Thus: 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Internal and external legitimacy have a positive impact on two out of 
three networked capabilities (replacing nodes and replacing linkages). 
 
Networked Capability 
As hinted at in Propositions 1 and 2, networked capability emerges from our 
research as a factor that links network characteristics to operational activity. In 
short, this networked capability appears to comprise a constellation of three abilities 
that a dark network needs to master in order to be resilient. 
The first ability that emerges from our cases is replacing nodes. This variable 
refers to the number of actors—nodes, in network terminology—which make up the 
actual people in the dark network. These individuals need to be recruited, trained, 
and deployed. This variable measures the flow of people in and out of the network 
and represents the degree to which the network is able to maintain its numbers, 
skills, and knowledge; add new members; or replace actors who are killed, captured, 
or desert the cause. 
The second component of networked capability is replacing linkages. Linkages—or 
ties, in network terminology—are the relations that connect the nodes, which can 
take different forms ranging including friendship, kinship, authority, exchange relations, 
shared faith, or ideology. These relationships can be social relationships 
(kinship), interaction (talking), or flows (information, resources) (Borgatti et al., 
2009). This variable measures the extent to which the network is able to maintain, 
replace, and create additional linkages. Because nodes and linkages are the central 
building blocks of networks, maintaining them or replacing them is a prerequisite to 
keeping a network alive. However, as Carley (2006, p. 55) argues, the impact of 
removed nodes has a cascading effect. When nodes are taken out, relations and paths 
are also broken, whereas nodes continue to exist if only linkages are disrupted. 
The third, and slightly more complex, component of networked capability is balancing 
differentiation and integration.6 As argued by classical organization theorists 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), social systems are likely to be more effective when 
they manage to balance differentiation and integration, that is, to reap the benefits 
of functional specialization by maintaining a high level of coordination. However, 
the stronger the functional differentiation, the more complex the integration mechanisms 
need to be in order to achieve or maintain the capacity to act. Especially 
strong functional differentiation requires direct mutual coordination through communication, 
by e-mail, regular mail, phone, couriers, or face-to-face communication. 
With regard to dark networks, the dilemma is that the more complex the integration 
mechanisms have to be in order to deal with an uncertain task environment and 
functional differentiation, the more susceptible dark networks will be to attack. 
Every communication link increases the probability of discovery, as it is in danger 
of being intercepted, endangers covertness, and gives the government the chance to 
roll up the network. Thus, as Krebs (2001) has shown for the network structure of 
the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, dark networks try to 
function with as few ties as possible and try to maintain global coordination with 
transitory shortcuts that connect different groups within a network and are activated 
only from time to time. Therefore, in order to survive, dark networks have to 
build in redundancies in skills that weaken functional differentiation and are less 
efficient (Milward & Raab, 2006). This is often referred to as the trade-off between 
persistence—the need to fight another day—and capacity—the need to attack the 
enemy (Stern, 2003). Attacking requires coordinated activity, increasing the probability 
of detection. Persistence requires periods of relative passivity, increasing the 
probability of defections and a decline in legitimacy. 
Each of the above capabilities is likely to impact the level of operational activity. 
The capability to maintain, replace, or substitute nodes and linkages that have disappeared 
is the key to understanding the development of operational activity after a 
shock. Dark networks that lose their members and are not able to replace them will 
cease to exist. Having a sufficient number of individuals who have adequate skills 
and are willing to risk their freedom and their lives is a necessary condition for dark 
networks to engage in any kind of action. Likewise, if the linkages between the members 
are cut, the network is entirely fragmented and joint action impossible. 
However, the issue is not only the quantity of nodes and linkages but their quality. 
Individuals represent certain nodes possessing essential skills that, if eliminated, 
are not easily replaced. Skills in using sophisticated weapons, bomb making, forging 
documents and passports, writing statements, developing political ideas and 
strategies, or organizing drug transports all are in short supply. Likewise, the richness 
of information channels and the level of trust between members have to be 
rebuilt after linkages have been interrupted for a time. Dark networks, therefore, 
must be able not only to replace or substitute nodes and restore linkages but to 
replace them at the same level of quality in order to reach the same level of operational 
activity as before the shock. In the case of MK, the arrest of its leadership 
deprived it of its key strategic, political, and organizational capabilities and also cut 
the linkages between other nodes in the network that were connected through these 
members. It took MK a very long time to rebound after this shock and achieve a 
level of activity that, in the end, exceeded the one before the Rivonia Raid. It was 
not until after the Soweto uprising 13 years later produced an enormous inflow of 
new members that the level of activity increased again (see Figure 3). 
The LTTE, due to its control over territory, was able to replace its captured or 
killed members in 2008 and 2009 but only through forced recruitment, which could 
not restore its fighting power and further damaged its legitimacy. After the LTTE 
lost Elephant Pass in 2009, which for almost two decades had made it possible to 
control land access to its territory, its strategic options were limited as LTTE was 
pushed into a smaller and smaller space with the sea at its back. In contrast, the 
FARC managed to retreat from the pressure exerted by the Colombian government 
and regroup given their command over territory and considerable resources. Thus, 
during the time of observation until 2006, FARC nodes were not taken out in numbers 
or of a quality that could affect the FARC, leading to the robustness documented 
in our analyses. 
With regard to the third networked capability, balancing differentiation and integration 
proved to be a very important factor in the context of MK’s resilience, as it 
is the way a network makes the trade-off between persistence (survival) and capacity 
(the ability to strike the enemy). After the shock in which virtually all members 
of MK’s high command had been arrested, MK’s structure had been decentralized 
and differentiated to accommodate the threat to its survival. Only when MK opted 
for a more integrated approach did it regain its ability to engage in effective insurgency 
against the apartheid regime, even while exposing the network to greater risk. 
For the FARC, integration was mainly achieved by setting up an approach in which 
drug trafficking and kidnapping were utilized to support its political goals (i.e., 
overthrowing the state and forcing a redistribution of land). The crucial element of 
integration/differentiation is to strike a successful balance between the two. In MK, 
increasing levels of integration reflected more favorable circumstances in the environment, 
as well as higher levels of legitimacy and resources at the time. These findings 
are consistent with the findings that Carley (2006) uncovered in a recent simulation 
study: Networks that consist of loosely coupled cells (i.e., networks that are only 
weakly integrated) are the most difficult to disrupt and the most adaptable, but also 
perform relatively poorly as they have limited capacity to act. 
In light of the above, our data indicate that the three networked capabilities have 
a positive effect on a dark network’s level of operational activity. These findings lead 
to the following set of propositions: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: The greater the ability of a dark network to maintain and replace nodes 
and linkages, the higher its level of operational activity. 
PROPOSITION 4: The better a dark network is able to balance differentiation and integration 
given a certain level of uncertainty, the higher its level of operational activity. 
Moderating Variables 
In addition to the role of network characteristics and networked capability in 
explaining the resilience of dark networks, we found two moderating variables (centralization 
and motivation) that also affect resilience. 
 
Centralization 
Network centralization is a key variable in the network analytic approach and can 
refer to a skewed connectivity distribution: Many nodes have a few links, while a 
few have many (Albert, Jeong, & Barabasi, 2000). In the extreme case, a network 
can have one leader who would connect all other members, who are not themselves 
connected. Among the three cases analyzed, both MK before the Rivonia Raid and 
the LTTE displayed a high level of centralization. In both cases, the center was represented 
by a collective council, where all the leaders frequently met face-to-face. In 
contrast to MK, the LTTE was very strongly dominated by its commander, 
Prabhakaran, who had been its leader for more than two decades: “Prabhakaran’s 
pivotal role and unchallenged influence over the organization was evidenced by the 
fact that each morning each cadre pledged allegiance directly to Prabhakaran 
himself—not to the LTTE or even the Tamil nation or people” (Hoffman, 2009, p. 466). 
His leadership was further characterized by authoritarian decisions, and his 
absolute power was seldom disputed within the LTTE (Voorde, 2005, p. 185). The 
Central Committee of the LTTE was tightly controlled by Prabhakaran, and none of 
its members—save Colonel Karuna, who split with Prabhakaran in 2004—dared 
challenge him. The LTTE can, therefore, be regarded as one of the most centralized 
dark networks in the world. Every significant decision—whether political, military, 
financial, or administrative—had to be approved by Prabhakaran.7 
In the case of MK, its centralized structure early in its evolution made the network 
vulnerable to external shocks, especially because MK to a large extent relied on its 
inspirational leaders, who were now in jail. Thus, the arrest of the core members disrupted 
the network to the extent that outside of this captured group there resided no 
authority or experience in leading the network. Since the LTTE’s longtime leader, 
Prabhakaran, and at least two other leaders of the LTTE’s central governing committee 
were killed, the LTTE has for now been defeated and dismantled in Sri Lanka 
(Anderson, 2011; Where Next, 2009). This finding confirms the seminal work by 
Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi (2000), who found that the more “scale free”—that is, the 
more centralized—social networks are, the more vulnerable they are to deliberate attack 
aimed at central, well-connected nodes. The difference in what happened to MK and the 
LTTE when they lost their central nodes is striking. Nelson Mandela was captured at 
the beginning of MK’s struggle, and his imprisonment lent legitimacy to MK’s and 
the ANC’s struggle against apartheid. This allowed MK to slowly regroup, recruit, 
and rebound. In contrast, when Prabhakaran was killed, the LTTE had run out of 
both legitimacy and territory, leading to the demise of the network. 
In contrast to MK and the LTTE, our third case, the FARC, which was robust, was 
organized in a rather decentralized manner; available data indicate that the FARC 
was organized into as many as 60 separate fronts (Richani, 1997). 
These findings lead us to propose that if a dark network is highly centralized, the 
effects of a shock on the network characteristics, such as human resources and 
uncertainty, are likely to be aggravated, because a higher level of centralization in 
essence means that important decisions and functions are limited to a small percentage 
of the network’s actors and linkages. When some or all of these actors are 
captured, a higher degree of centralization implies that peripheral network members 
are less likely to be able to access existing information or to gather new 
resources. Also, peripheral members are less likely to successfully process the information 
(i.e., control the uncertainty) by teaming up with remaining members, since 
communication channels are more likely to be interrupted. For these reasons, centralization 
represents an important moderator of the effects of a shock on network 
characteristics. We therefore suggest: 
PROPOSITION 5: Centralization moderates between a shock and the impact on network 
characteristics: When a network is centralized, the shock’s impact on network characteristics 
is likely to be larger than for decentralized networks. 
 
Motivation 
The second moderating variable that we find concerns the motivation for the dark 
network members to first engage the network and then maintain it over time. 
Whereas MK was motivated by political means over its entire existence, the FARC, as 
it aged, relied more on resources derived from the drug trade to maintain its motivation. 
The LTTE represents a somewhat mixed case. While political motives (independence 
for a Tamil homeland) overwhelmingly dominated until the end, the network 
employed some criminal activity in the form of credit card, check, and bank fraud to 
create financial revenue.8 This distinction is reminiscent of previous work on greed 
versus grievance as the main motivators for the formation of clandestine networks. 
Specifically, this work suggests that greed-driven goals are apolitical and should be 
seen as a form of organized crime, which generates its income from extortion or the 
sale of illegal goods and services (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). In contrast, dark networks 
that focus on grievance are motivated by more political goals and intrinsic motivations, 
fueled by, for instance, inequitable distribution of resources, displacement of 
local communities, or environmental degradation that generates opposition 
(Peceny & Durnan, 2006). Kenney (2003, p. 196), perhaps unintentionally, applies this 
dichotomy to drug trafficking networks versus al-Qaeda when he states: 
Another key contrast regards motivation: trafficking enterprises are inspired by the pursuit 
of profit, while Al-Qaeda is driven by a complex amalgam of religious, ideological, 
and political considerations. Whereas the motivations of drug dealers weaken or intensify 
according to the amount of money to be reaped from drug trafficking, Al-Qaeda and 
its followers are “true believers” in religious imperatives and concomitant political convictions 
whose motives are largely unaffected by profit. 
As a result, Kenney (2003) argues that al-Qaeda’s grievance-inspired network might 
be more vulnerable in the short term, as opposed to drug lords whose networks are 
inspired by greed, because a steady demand on the international drug market will create 
sufficient incentive for other drug traffickers to immediately take over the activity if 
one or a few are arrested or killed. However, a drop in activity of a grievance-driven 
network in the short term after a leader is eliminated may be compensated for by the 
ideological or religious convictions of other members in the long term. 
In the grievance-driven MK, resources were a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for organizational activity; legitimacy was the more important factor. 
Resources like access to training camps in neighboring countries supported the 
actions that propelled the network’s political aspirations and one of the main reasons 
they had access to such resources. It can be argued that its legitimacy in representing 
an oppressed people was so strong that the political game played out at 
the U.N. and other international arenas supported its battles within South Africa, 
rather than success on the battlefield leading to an increase in legitimacy. 
Ultimately, the armed struggle was less important than the political game, because 
the ANC leaders knew that they were as likely to prevail against the apartheid 
regime through external political pressure as through internal military victory; 
indeed, they were proven right when the apartheid regime realized that without 
bringing the ANC into the political process, South Africa was ungovernable. 
For the partially greed-driven FARC network, however, resources proved crucial. 
The FARC case indicates that financial resources can motivate the network. The 
FARC’s entanglement in the drug industry eroded some of its legitimacy, but even 
with diminishing levels of legitimacy, the number of recruits grew. In this sense, 
greed-driven networks may be able to be able to trade legitimacy for resources, in 
that resources substitute for legitimacy up to a point, particularly if there are few 
legitimate options for the employment of young men in the network’s area. 
However, the extent to which resources and legitimacy can compensate for one 
another seems to be dependent on the motivation of the network. Grievance-driven 
networks seem not to be able to afford to see their external and internal legitimacy 
sink too low because they would then be regarded as simply a criminal network, 
and it would become increasingly more difficult to retain or recruit people, even 
with money, and much harder, if not impossible, to maintain international and 
regional support, as the LTTE found. In greed-driven networks, legitimacy that may 
come from providing some social services to a local population certainly helps, but 
is not a necessary condition for existence. Eventual loss of legitimacy can therefore 
be compensated for much more easily with resources used to recruit new members, 
especially if the rewards are high. In other words, resources and legitimacy both 
positively impact a dark network’s ability to replace nodes and linkages, but this 
effect is moderated by the motivation of the network. A grievance-driven network 
will suffer much more from a loss of legitimacy and must carefully balance its activities 
with its resources. This moderating effect, however, does not occur when balancing 
differentiation and integration. This balancing process, as argued above, is 
an instrumental process in determining the necessary tasks and subsequently coordinating 
them, which is the same for both grievance- and greed-driven networks. 
Our final proposition, therefore, states the following: 
PROPOSITION 6: Network motivation moderates the relation between network 
characteristics (legitimacy and resources) and two out of three network capabilities 
(replacing nodes and replacing linkages, but not balancing integration and differentiation): 
For grievancedriven networks, the effect of a change in legitimacy will be stronger than for 
greed-driven networks, while the reverse is true for a change in resources. 
DISCUSSION 
In the present paper we have tried to understand and interpret the organizational 
changes dark networks undergo after massive shocks and attacks by nation states. 
We were especially interested in the factors that influence dark network resilience 
and advanced a theoretical model based on the analysis of MK, the armed wing of 
the ANC in South Africa during apartheid; the LTTE, a militant liberation group in 
Sri Lanka; and the FARC, the Marxist rebel group in Colombia. We formulated six 
propositions based on the amount of resources and the level of legitimacy held by 
a dark network (network characteristics), moderated by the degree of centralization 
and the type of motivation of the dark network; the primary variables influencing 
dark network resilience are their ability to maintain and replace actors and linkages 
and make strategic trade-offs between differentiation and integration (which we 
term networked capability) in the wake of a shock. After a massive shock caused by 
state intervention, we were able to identify three different resilience paths: robustness, 
in which no significant drop in operational visibility occurs; rebounding, in 
which the dark network is able to bounce back after being heavily affected by the 
shock; and nonresilience, in which the dark network is unable to recover and ceases 
to exist. We believe that a major advance of this research over earlier work is that 
we introduced a theoretical model that is sensitive to the dynamics behind 
resilience and can capture these changes over time, as measured by the operational 
activities of the dark networks. 
In addition, we contribute to previous research on covert networks by bringing 
together structural features of networks and environmental factors in order to 
explain their resilience. One factor that clearly emerged from our study that some 
might find surprising is the importance of legitimacy for grievance-driven dark networks. 
This constitutes quite a leap from many policy initiatives that are geared 
solely toward the eradication of dark networks by blunt force. We find that such 
blunt attempts can have unintended side effects: For every MK combatant killed by 
police fire, ten new ones stood up to join the network. Conversely, ignoring legitimacy 
is a sure route to failure. The LTTE sacrificed its international support by not 
recognizing that after September 11, governments were much less tolerant of illegal 
and covert networks than before. At the same time, when it became clear that 
the LTTE was not serious about a political settlement, the group fractured, and the 
subsequent need to forcibly recruit young boys as fighters became a clear sign of 
the LTTE’s decreasing legitimacy among the Tamil people. 
Related to our findings on the importance of legitimacy for dark networks, 
there is a serious policy discussion regarding the use of overwhelming deadly 
force against suspected terrorists and the leaders of these groups (Cronin, 2009, 
pp. 14–34) and also the wisdom of targeted killings. As General Mike Mullin, chairman 
of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated in describing the nature of a counterinsurgency 
war, “We can’t kill our way to victory in Afghanistan” (Admiral, 
2008). 
In essence, the policy problem is to reduce the number of potential terrorist 
recruits for the network. If you can reduce this denominator, the terrorist network 
will face constrained choices about its options and its resilience should decrease as 
fighters are killed or captured or, as in the LTTE case, they must resort to compelling 
unwilling children to fight. In the latter case, while the numbers increased, 
LTTE fighting efficiency declined. Our results thus imply that policymakers should 
pay close attention to the management of public opinion by avoiding collateral 
damage to the degree possible, or using what Paul, Clarke, and Grill (2010a, p. 36) 
call “the hearts and minds approach,” which they find to be an important factor in 
counterinsurgency success (see also Paul, Clarke, & Grill, 2010b). Actions taken 
by the insurgents like suicide bombings and large-scale civilian deaths will decrease 
the legitimacy of these insurgent groups. Losing external legitimacy makes grievancedriven 
networks more vulnerable to disruption as civilians will then feel more reason 
to provide rather than withhold information requested by the state on the insurgents’ 
whereabouts. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The factors that contribute to our theory are in essence policy variables that both 
governments and insurgents can influence. They constitute a common set of levers 
that both parties use to contest a conflict. While there is a growing literature on the 
sources of counterinsurgency success (Paul Clarke, & Grill, 2010a, 2010b), the costs 
and benefits of various government strategies against insurgents (Cronin, 2009), and 
strategies for combating dark networks (Roberts & Everton, 2011), in this paper the 
focus has been on the manner in which either the dark network or the government 
can influence how resilient a dark network is likely to be. 
There are a number of policy implications that we have uncovered in this 
research. While our model of resilience is “one-sided” in that data were collected 
only from operational activities of the dark network, our findings convincingly 
show that the key to resilience or defeat by a government is based on how rapidly 
a dark network can adapt to the changes that have occurred in its networked capability 
after a shock of major proportions. If the government can follow up its gains 
and delay this adaptation, rebounding or robustness will become all the more problematic 
for the dark network. MK made a juvenile mistake that almost destroyed it, 
and it was brought slowly back to life by the repression, violence, and international 
outrage against apartheid and the Afrikaner regime in Pretoria. The LTTE adapted 
well in its tactics and in maintaining its operational activity until the supreme 
leader, Prabhakaran, became unable or unwilling to change tactics that had served 
him well for many years. Here, two things are clear. First, at some point, leaders 
have to think about an end game that does not include complete victory or defeat. 
Most conflicts end in a negotiated settlement. Prabhakaran could not compromise 
and instead led his movement to annihilation and his people to utter defeat. This 
nonresilient network was also a product of Prabhakaran’s inability to understand 
that the environment he was operating in had changed as well and that his 
resources were being destroyed faster than they could be replaced. At the same 
time, Western governments cracked down on terrorism and he lost legitimacy 
among his own people after the defection of Colonel Karuna with 6,000 of the 
LTTE’s best troops. Second, a dark network will have to very skillfully balance integration 
and differentiation over the arc of its insurgency. This is a central management 
task as the dark network tries to determine what it can accomplish, given the 
forces arrayed against it, versus how decentralized it needs to be to survive to fight 
another day. A government that can goad a dark network into a balance that it is 
unprepared for is likely to have the upper hand. 
An additional implication of our study concerns the importance of resources. 
Resources impact resilience in several different ways. Physical space is very important. 
MK was able to survive in part because when countries around South Africa 
gained their independence, MK gained training bases and places to recruit and 
recover. The FARC was able to retreat into the jungle as pressure on it increased. 
The LTTE, on the other hand, was funneled down a peninsula where their backs 
were pinned against the sea until they were destroyed. Finance is a critical resource, 
and each network handled it differently. The FARC has funded most of its operations 
out of drug trafficking. Self-financing has been an important factor in its survival. 
The LTTE derived much of its revenue from two sources. The first was money 
flowing from the Tamil diaspora abroad and the second was from taxes collected in 
areas they controlled. MK was able to generate a great deal of money from opponents 
of apartheid all over the world (including the Soviet Union and Scandinavia). 
In counterinsurgency warfare, the central contest is over the hearts and minds of 
the population. We refer to this as legitimacy and break the concept into external 
and internal components. In our three cases, MK had so much internal and external 
legitimacy that South Africa became ungovernable without it, leading directly 
to Mandela’s release. As the conflict in Sri Lanka progressed, the legitimacy of the 
LTTE declined to the point that it became possible for the government to adopt a 
policy of annihilation against the LTTE. The FARC reminds us that up to some 
undefined point, resources can be substituted for legitimacy. As drug trafficking 
became a bigger and bigger part of their operation, the FARC was able to buy new 
recruits even though trafficking in drugs made them far less acceptable as a cause 
for leftists around the world, with the possible exception of Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela. 
Resources and legitimacy have an effect on networked capability, the link 
between network characteristics and operational capacity, which is our surrogate 
measure for resilience. The ability of the leaders of dark networks to replace nodes 
with people who have equivalent skills and knowledge as those they replace is critical, 
as is replacing linkages that existed before the shock or attack. If not replaced 
quickly, the linkages can quickly degrade, and it may become much more difficult 
to find a safe house, or new recruits may simply have fewer skills. Nodes and linkages 
are the central building blocks of networks, and if the kill/capture rate is higher than 
the replacement rate, the dark network is in trouble. The capability to maintain, 
replace, or substitute nodes and linkages that have been destroyed, therefore, is key 
to understanding the resilience of dark networks. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Along with the contributions outlined, this study has several limitations. First, 
although the conceptualization and operationalization of resilience has proven useful 
throughout the study, it still lacks a broader empirical base, and should therefore 
be regarded as preliminary. Relatedly, the measurement and operationalization of 
operational activity and shocks was limited. With regard to operational activity, the 
most important problem is related to the fact that many dark network activities 
are by definition intentionally difficult to observe. Even an objectified, quantitative 
measure cannot correct for this. The qualitative understanding developed in this 
study may not be optimal, but for the time being it seems one of the best options 
available to assess a dark network’s resilience. 
Second, future research might also consider more sophisticated patterns of 
operational activity. While we limited the study to three main patterns of possible operational 
activity, in reality, much more complex patterns—involving concave-shaped 
curves and networks displaying robustness, rebounding, and nonresilience in different 
time periods—can be studied, as dark networks will clearly sustain multiple 
shocks. Moreover, we do not yet systematically distinguish between networks that 
bounce back but stay basically the same, and those networks that transform entirely, 
replacing the majority of its people and only carrying over its covert activity. 
Future research should therefore investigate to what extent these paths differ and 
should therefore be distinguished. In addition, future research might more specifically 
tackle the issue, mentioned earlier, of whether the resilience of “pure” dark 
networks substantially differs from those characterized by additional organizational 
characteristics. Specifically, this would require future research to study the extent 
to which factors such as the level of hierarchical coordination, the type of role 
structure, and the level of institutionalization in the command system are important 
to resilience. 
Third, an important question for further research is whether our model and its 
propositions could be extended to the whole population of dark networks, that is, to 
purely criminal networks like the Russian mafia or drug gangs in the United States. 
A mature theory of dark network resilience should ultimately be able to account for 
various types of covert and illegal activity, not just terrorism. Two of our dark networks 
did engage in some level of traditional criminal activity that may provide ideas 
for future research on criminal networks. The FARC taxes the cultivation, processing, 
and trafficking of drugs in areas they control and in return provides protection 
to the cultivators and traffickers. The Tamil Tigers engaged in drug trafficking as 
well (Felbab-Brown, 2010, pp. 188–189). In both cases, criminal activities enabled 
the insurgencies to purchase more and better weaponry. However, there may be a 
cost to engaging in criminal activity. While the capacity of the dark network to act 
may be enhanced by the profits from crime, this increase in capacity must be balanced 
against the cost of these activities. With a limited number of fighters, a dark 
network would have to judiciously allocate its human resources to see an increase 
in its capacity to strike the government rather than just protect traffickers and the 
local population with better weapons. Our theory therefore suggests that while 
grievance-driven networks face a trade-off between legitimacy and resources, greeddriven 
networks have to concentrate on securing the continuous flow of resources 
to retain and replace people and keep up the criminal activity. We believe that our 
current framework is a suitable point of departure to analyze the resilience of dark 
networks in their different varieties, but that resources and legitimacy presumably 
have different effects dependent on the motivational mix among dark networks. 
Fourth, with regard to shocks, it remains difficult to make a comparative assessment 
of the magnitude of a shock because the circumstances are quite specific to 
each case. We can only state at this point that the shocks were considerable in all 
three of our cases in terms of the state’s effort and impact, but that the consequences 
were different. We should also note that the qualification of the magnitude of the 
shock is dependent upon its relative impact on each network—the absolute quantity 
of assets seized or members arrested is not decisive; rather, their relative number is. 
As a consequence of this relative impact, uncertainty for a network will increase differently. 
To avoid this limitation one would have to either look at more cases or select 
cases with roughly the same type and strength of shock, a strategy that remains conceptually 
difficult and was not possible in this study due to data restrictions. 
Fifth, we were not able in this paper to specify the process of replacing nodes and 
reestablishing linkages. We believe this to be one of the major questions for further 
research; that is, to what extent and how do rebounding networks orchestrate 
recruitment and how does the operational process of reestablishing linkages unfold 
given the specific circumstances a dark network finds itself in after a shock? What role 
does the network’s governance and structure play in this process and how does the 
inner core of a network relate to the wider social movement in the case of grievancedriven 
networks? Since direct observation of these processes is almost impossible 
in the case of dark networks, retrospective interviews with participants might be a 
solution to this data collection problem, since documents like those used in this 
study typically do not contain this information. 
Sixth, inherent in dark network research is limited access to direct, firsthand 
data. A challenge for future research, then, is to find enough reliable dark network 
data to further test the proposed model in spite of these difficulties. 
Finally, the model developed in this study might be tested in a deductive fashion, 
using network data from a larger number of cases that are similar in size and scope, 
which could enhance the model’s validity. Interestingly, many of the variables we found 
are known in the general organizational literature as well, which should help in operationalizing 
and testing our propositions in the future. Dark networks, like bright networks, 
appear to need resources, internal and external legitimacy (although this is true 
in grievance-driven more than greed-driven networks), and need to balance integration 
and differentiation. This finding indicates that it should be possible to further develop 
the theory we have proposed and to posit specific policy recommendations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the limitations described, we are confident that the key variables we identified 
in this study, namely network characteristics (legitimacy and resources) and 
network capability (ability to replace nodes and linkages as well as balance integration 
and differentiation), with centralization and motivation as moderating variables, 
help us to gain a deeper understanding of dark network resilience. Moreover, these 
variables indicate that if there is one message to be taken from the present article, 
it is that states can only successfully combat dark networks by degrading their 
resilience if state actors analyze them in a broader organizational, societal, and 
political context; this will enable states to find the decisive factors in each case that 
will significantly reduce a dark network’s ability to replace nodes and (re)establish 
linkages over time. 
 
Footnotes: 
1 While the FARC suffered undeniable reverses in 2008 with the deaths and defections of top leaders 
and the freeing of their most valued hostages, the FARC is still a power to be reckoned with, 
especially in rural areas (Isacson, 2009). In fact, reports in 2009 emphasized that the FARC are likely 
to persist for a long time into the future, stepping up extortion demands and holding on to their drug 
trade (FARC Rallies, 2009). However, the future of the FARC recently seemed to become more 
uncertain after it faced a new shock, when an important camp of the FARC was bombed and raided 
and one of the most experienced senior military commanders and the FARC’s number two, Victor 
Julio Suarez Rojas (aka Jorge Briceno and El Mono Jojoy), was killed in a Colombian military 
operation (Stratfor, 2010). This new shock, however, falls outside of our window of analysis. 
2 The numbers of combatants over time were approximately 2006: 6,000; 2007: 5,000; 2008: 7,000; 
2009: 7,500 (R. Gunaratna, pers. comm., September 25, 2010). 
3 We thank Renate Mayntz for the suggestion that space is an important resource for dark networks. 
4 R. Gunaratna (pers. comm., December 13, 2010) in The Hague, The Netherlands. 
5 It therefore does not come as a surprise that the violent eradication of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan 
government happened with only muted condemnation of its actions or even support by some states 
(Mayilvaganan, 2009), even though it lost its seat on the United Nations Human Rights Council (The 
War President, 2008). 
6 In the interest of shortening the case descriptions, we omitted explanations of how each of our 
three networks balanced differentiation and integration. However, in this section we briefly explain 
the tradeoffs each network made and how we derived it as a component of network capability. 
7 R. Gunaratna (pers. comm., October 26, 2010). 
8 R. Gunaratna (pers. comm., September 29, 2010). 
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